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Abstract: This article employs game theory to contribute to sociolinguistics
(or the economics of language). From both the synchronic and the diachronic
perspective, we are interested in the conditions (of language learning and
literary production) that make some languages dominate others. Two results
are particularly noteworthy: (i) Translations have an ambiguous effect on dom-
ination. (ii) We offer three different explanations of how a past language like
Latin or Sanskrit can develop into a standard for literary production.
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1 Introduction
This article discusses language competition. We build simple game-theoretic
models that reflect upon English as a global language and Latin or Sanskrit as
old languages that have been in use for literary production long after they
ceased to be (if they ever were) “mother tongues”. Thus, we try to contribute
to the economics of language.
A very broad take on language and economy is Coulmas (1992). Grin and
Vaillancourt (1997: 43) define the economics of language as the study of (i) “the
relationships between linguistic and economic variables” and also of (ii) “language-
related issues where economic variables have little or no part, but which can
nevertheless be examined with the concepts and methods of neo-classical eco-
nomics”. Referring to the surveys by Grin (1996) and Grin and Vaillancourt (1997),
our article is not about socioeconomic variables like consumption, income
(inequality), or status, all of which have been examined in relation to languages
or language skills, nor about nationalism and language planning. Thus, it does not
come under part (i) of the above definition, but quite clearly under part (ii). More
specifically, it can be seen as an application of methods known from an economic
subfield called Industrial Organization to language production and learning.
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Industrial Organization (often abbreviated by IO) is concerned with theore-
tical and empirical work on the behavior of monopolistic and oligopolistic firms.
These firms set prices, advertise their products, or decide on research and
development, etc., while keeping their customers and competitors in mind.
Whenever more than two firms are involved, IO uses game theory and employs
solution concepts like the Nash equilibrium or backward induction. The stan-
dard treatise on IO is Tirole (1988).
Fitting to the IO framework, we model literary producers (the firms) and
readers (the customers). We first turn to the readers. They enjoy literature with
their enjoyment depending on the language used in that literature. In order to
gain access to literature written in foreign languages, readers may decide to
learn those languages. Their learning decisions depend (i) on the cost of learn-
ing and also (ii) on the literature made available to the reader. Thus, language
learners are depicted as rational deciders paying attention to the instrumental
value of languages, only. As objections against this modelling decision, one may
point to symbolic domination (Bourdieu 1977 and, for a case-based application,
Heller 1995), to the passion fueled by language issues (Grin 1996: 28–29) and to
motivation and affection (see the recent collection of articles edited by Gabrys-
Barker and Bielska (2013)). We do not intent to deny the importance of these
aspects. However, for reasons of tractability, we think it a wise decision to
disregard them in the models presented here.
The difficulty of language learning is a thorny issue. In our article, we assume
that the readers can weigh their cost of learning against the utility of being able to
read a wider range of literary production. We also take into account that people
with a given mother tongue may well have different cost of learning a second
language (i.e., different talents for foreign languages). In some models, we allow
for languages that are “easier” to learn (across all potential learners) than others.
Here, we do not elaborate on the findings of contrastive linguistics (see the
seminal work by Lado (1957) and the more recent edited volume by Gonzalez
et al. (2008)) that ease of learning depends on the genetic or typological relation-
ship of the learners’ first language and the one they endeavor to learn. In other
models, we assume that the languages in question have the same difficulty level.
Contrastive issues are also relevant for another central element in our
modelling that we call accessibility. A reader has full access to literary products
employing his mother tongue. He may also profit from literature employing
another language when he has learned that language. There may be two differ-
ent reasons for a reduced accessibility. First, the reader may read the original
foreign literature and understand part of it, only. Second, the reader may obtain
a translation of the foreign literature. In that case, reduced accessibility stands
for the limited amount and/or quality of literary works that are translated into
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the reader’s mother tongue. Or, it may be an expression of the dislike to read
translated, rather than original, literature.
The producers in our model do not try to maximize profits as would be the
usual assumption in IO models. Instead, they strive to maximize “readership”.
They do so by choosing a language for producing literature. Naively, literary
production can be measured in the number of pages produced or in the number
of books (of a certain minimum quality). The assumption of readership max-
imization seems plausible in different respects. First, a producer may have
material reasons for “selling” his books or for winning the patronage of a king
(then we are very close to the profit motive of IO). Second, he may want to press
a political or religious agenda.
Readership can be operationalized in different manners. It may be based on
option demand (see, in the context of prices, Schmalensee (1972)). In that model,
readers do not benefit from actual reading, but from the possibility to choose
from a wide range of literary products. In other words, the readers care for the
option to have many different books at their disposal. An alternative model
deals with non-option demand. Here, the readers’ benefit revolves around the
actually read books. Obviously, both models (option demand and non-option
demand) are extreme cases. We consider these extreme cases because we can
learn something from each of them, but we certainly need to keep in mind the
restrictive assumptions employed.
Readership may also be understood as “current” or as “long-term”. Current
readership refers to readers that are alive during the producer’s lifetime.
Alternatively, a literary producer may take a long-term view. For example, the
author or the group he represents may want long-term recognition (fame) and
influence. This case may be relevant for religious or political groups. Or the
author may sell the book rights during his lifetime and therefore has a profit
motive for writing for future generations, also.
Our article is not the first to employ game theory to linguistics. Following
the work by Parikh (see, for example, Parikh (2001)), game theory has entered
linguistics in efforts to explore pragmatics and, in particular, meaning (see, for
example, the introduction to the edited volume by Benz et al. (2011) and also the
book by Clark (2011)). Evolutionary game theory has also been used by some
linguists (see part II in Benz et al. (2011)). It seems that this part of game theory
has, as yet, not been applied to the problem addressed in the current article:
how do the numbers of speakers, producers and learners of languages evolve
over time?
An early game-theoretic approach to the acquisition of foreign-language skills
is Selten and Pool (1991). In that paper, the size of language communities and the
learning cost are important factors. The learners strive for communicative benefit
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and, in contrast to our model, literary production is absent. The same general
features are present (and absent) in the model by Church and King (1993).
However, since these authors employ more specific assumptions, they can deduce
more specific results than Selten and Pool (1991). In particular, they focus on the
question of how the cost of learning influences second-language learning.
It seems to us that this article is the first to employ the IO approach (where
both producers and consumers are relevant) to literary production and language
learning. In a rough manner, our article builds on, and reconstructs some
stylized facts. We take as given the following facts:
L Language learning: people tend to learn (L) foreign languages that have
many speakers or exhibit extended literary production, both current and
past.
R Language choice by producers: authors tend to favor languages that allow
for a large readership (R) of their literary products.
Ct Language change, over time: languages change over time (Ct) and accessi-
bility is a decreasing function of time gone by.
Cf Language change, forking: a language 0 may fork into daughter languages 1
and 2. Then, languages 1 and 2 may (or may not) be less accessible from
each other than language 0 from language 1 or language 2.
We comment on (Ct) and (Cf). Examples for (Ct) are easy to find. Latin is more
accessible from Old French than from New French. Sanskrit is more accessible
from Pali than from Hindi.
In contrast, (Cf) is contentious. Forking is to be understood within a tree
model of language change. The tree model (also called genetic or cladistic
model) has been under attack by linguists (mainly dialectologists) for well
over 100 years. Francois (2014) is a recent summary of alternative models that
come under the headings of waves, linkages or continua.1 Surely, these alter-
native models capture language change more accurately than the rather coarse
tree model. However, a justification for language trees is provided by Gray and
Atkinson (2003: 436) who apply some sort of Bayesian glottochronology to Indo-
European languages and report a “strong tree-like signal”. Indeed, comparative
linguists seem comfortable using the tree model in their reconstructive work
(see, for example, Lehmann (1992: 121), Fortson IV (2004: 8–11) or Clackson
1 With a view to the continuum perspective, one may question the usual procedure of treating
languages as countable objects. Here, again, we would like to argue that the discreteness of
languages is a simplifying assumption that allows to do comparative work and that allows to do
the sort of theoretical exercise we have in mind. It is also a fact that people that are not linguists
clearly think and act in terms of discrete languages rather than continua of languages.
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(2007: 5–15)). Summarizing, despite the justified critique voiced by many lin-
guists, language trees remain the workhorse model for a lot of relevant work in
the diachronic domain. It is in this sense that (Cf) is employed in the current
article.
The accessibility question is also difficult. Assume that some language 0
undergoes two changes, C1 that produces language 1 and C2 that produces
language 2. Then, language 1 and language 2 are different from each other by
both changes. Instead, language 1 and language 0 differ by one of these
changes, only. By this argument, languages 1 and 2 should be less accessible
from each other than language 0 from language 1 or language 2. Against this
argument, one may point to Spanish and Italian that are more easily accessible
from each other than Latin is from Spanish or even Italian. Here, mutual
borrowing and the like have led to a reapproachment.
Using the facts (L) through (Cf), we reconstruct the following stylized facts:
D Dominance: both a contemporary language (as English nowadays) and a
“dead” language (like Latin or Sanskrit) may prevail over other languages
for oral or written purposes.
N Niche: readers competent in small languages have a smaller choice of
literature, but literary production does not totally sideline them.
We begin with synchronic models (next section). In these models, languages
coexist (like French and German). We consider two extreme models. The first
might be called the option-demand model. In that model, readers do not benefit
from actual reading, but from the possibility to choose from a wide range of
literary products. In other words, the readers care for the option to have many
different books at their disposal. The second model deals with non-option
demand. Here, the readers’ benefits revolve around the actually read books.
Within the synchronic, option-demand model, we obtain these results. In
line with (D), the chances of a language to dominate others are high if the
population using that language is large, if the past production is high, and if it is
relatively easy to learn. Also, if we have several literary producers, either
language may (within a certain range of parameters) become dominant. In
contrast, N results from non-option demand.
We then turn to diachronic models (Section 3) where languages change over
time (as Latin has developed into French). In these models, we investigate the
conditions under which production makes use of old languages. We identify two
different settings where this might happen. First, producers need to care for
future readership, not just for current readership. Second, in the competition
between synchronic languages, vernaculars may lose out to their common
predecessor language.
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2 Synchronic models
2.1 Setup
In our synchronic models, we have two periods t ¼ p; n (see Figure 1). Here, p
stands for “past” and n for “now”. We concentrate on period n. Hence, we build
a static model. We assume two languages called 1 and 2. In period n, there are q1
speakers with mother tongue 1 and q2 speakers with mother tongue 2.
By n1 (and n2), we denote language production in the current period that
employs language 1 (language 2, respectively). Overall literary production in
period n also uses the symbol n and is given by n ¼ n1 þ n2. We assume an
“installed base” for language 1 denoted by p1. This literary production is as
accessible as n1 : p2 is the installed base of literary production in language 2.
We consider the language learning decisions in the following section. We
then proceed to the production decision taken by one producer (Section 2.3) or
by several producers (Section 2.4). In these models, we define readership in an
option-demand manner. In Section 2.5, we assume actual enjoyment, only, and
disregard language learning.
2.2 Language learning
The speakers perfectly know their mother tongues, but may choose to learn the
foreign language with some cost c. We assume that the language learners know
the literary production in languages 0 and 1 and make their learning decisions
accordingly. In particular, we work with this payoff (or utility) function for a
native speaker of language 1:
u1 ¼
p1 þ n1 þ p2 þ n2ð Þ  c;
p1 þ n1 þ α2 p2 þ n2ð Þ;
1 learns language 2
1 does not learn language 2

period p
language 1 with production p1
language 2 with production p2
period n
language 1 with production n1 and population q1  
language 2 with production n2 and population q2
Figure 1: The synchronic model.
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Note the different accessibilities for a native speaker of language 1 to the literary
products of language 2. It equals 1, if 1 has learned language 2. Thus, we find
1  p2 þ n2ð Þ ¼ p2 þ n2ð Þ in the first line of utility function u1. In the second line,
we have α2 p2 þ n2ð Þ instead. For example (see also the introduction), a Spanish
reader may partly understand Italian literary works (accessibility α between 0.6
and 0.8), while a German reader’s accessibility to Italian writings is close to
zero. In general, we assume 0  α1 < 1 and 0  α2 < 1. Thus, a speaker of lan-
guage 1 has a reduced benefit of literary production in language 2 if he has not
learned language 2. A native speaker of language 1 benefits from learning the
other language if the following holds:
c< p2 þ n2ð Þ 1 α2ð Þ ¼: c2 ð1Þ
Inversely, language learning is not profitable for c >c2. Here, as in the rest of the
article, we will not be concerned with the (highly improbable)2 case of c ¼ c2.
We assume that the speakers’ costs of language learning are uniformly distrib-
uted on 0;C2½  with C2 > nþ p2. The latter assumption implies that there are
always agents who find language learning too hard. Then,
c2
C2
¼ p2 þ n2ð Þ 1 α2ð Þ
C2
< 1 ð2Þ
is the proportion of readers of language 1 that learn language 2. This result is in
line with (L) in the introduction.
Analogously, we define c1 ¼ ðp1 þ n1Þ 1 α1ð Þ and obtain the proportion of
readers that learn language 1
c1
C1
¼ p1 þ n1ð Þ 1 α1ð Þ
C1
< 1 ð3Þ
where we assume p1 þ n<C1.
We say that language 1 dominates language 2 with respect to language
learning if the percentage of language-1 learners c1C1 is larger than the percentage
of language-2 learners c2C2. This tends to hold under the following conditions:
– It is relatively easy to learn language 1 (C1 <C2).
– In the past, literary production in language 1 was relatively large (p1 > p2).
– The current literary production in language 1 is relatively large (n1 > n2).
– Accessibility for language-2 speakers to language 1 is relatively small
(α1 < α2).
2 Since we are dealing with a continuum of learning costs, the probability of c being equal to a
particular value is zero.
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We comment on the last bullet. In this model, language-learning dominance
of language 1 is furthered if there are many and good translations of language-2
literature into language 1. In this case, speakers of language 1 do not have large
incentives to learn language 2. From this result, we obtain an immediate policy
conclusion. If a country (let us say, France) wishes to make French dominant
with respect to language learning, it should translate important works of
foreign languages into French (or should subsidize these translations). It should
not, however, further translations of French works into foreign languages.
Note that the French government sponsored “Centre national du livre” (www.
centrenationaldulivre.fr/en/auteur-traducteur/presentation/, accessed 31 August
2015) subsidizes translations in both directions. In contrast, the German Goethe-
Institut (www.goethe.de/de/uun/auf/lit.html, accessed 31 August 2015) focuses
on translations of German books into foreign languages.
Note, however, that these recommendations follow from the specific model
employed. Like all models, some aspects may be left out that possibly militate
against these recommendations. For example, one may translate Victor Hugo into
other languages and thereby increase the interest for French culture and literature.
This increased interest may then feed into more people learning French. This effect
is not captured by our model. Another effect comes into play when we consider
literary production on top of the learning decision (see the following two sections).
2.3 Literary production with one producer (option demand)
We first assume that there is one producer, only. The producer chooses n1 and n2
in order to maximize his readership (see [R] in the introduction). We assume that
n is fixed and that the division of n ¼ n1 þ n2 between language 1 and 2 is up to
the literary producer. That is, the producer has a given capacity for literary
production and chooses between languages. Building on the payoff function
above, we define the readership for literary production n1 (and hence
n2 ¼ n n1) in a very simple and naive manner. We proceed in two steps.
First, we define readership for literary production n1 as n1 times




with mother tongue 2







with mother tongue 2





Readers with mother tongue 1 have full access to n1 which explains 1  q1.
Readers with mother tongue 2 consist of two types. Either they have learned
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language 1 (proportion c1C1) and then have full access. Or they have not learned
language 2 and hence are characterized by limited access α1.
Turning to the second step, we define (overall) readership for the literary
producer by






   






   
This definition requires a few comments. First, we have one producer. He can be
understood as representative for a diverse set of producers. Alternatively, we can
consider him a “benevolent dictator” who strives to maximize readership (if
readership is a measure of welfare). Second, the producer knows both lan-
guages. Third, readership is of the option-demand type. That is, a reader likes
the option to choose from a diverse selection of literature, over and above his
enjoyment from actually reading part of that literature. In the section after next,
we present a non-option model.
Proposition 2.1. In the synchronic model with 1 (representative) producer (bene-
volent dictator), language 1 or language 2 become the exclusive literary language
for production (compare [D]). In particular, language 1 tends to become the
standard language if
– the population q1 of language 1 is large (relative to the population q2 of
language 2),
– the cost C1 of learning language 1 is small (relative to the cost C2 of learning
language 2), or
– the literary base p1 of language 1 is large (relative to the literary base p2 of
language 2).
The effect of the accessibility parameters on language adoption is ambiguous.
Proof: see Appendix.
The effects of the population sizes, the cost of learning, and the literary bases on
language adoption are not too surprising. We want to discuss the two interesting
aspects of this proposition. First, only one of the languages is used for literary
production. This extreme result is due to the option-demand characteristic built
into the definition of readership above.
Second, the effect of the accessibility factors is ambiguous. An increase in
α1 has two opposing effects. At first, we disregard language learning, i.e., let (3)
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be constant focusing on the “direct effect” of an increased α1. The readership
function






   
þ ::: ð4Þ





þ . . . ð5Þ
reveals that the readership of language 1 increases if accessibility to language 1
increases for non-learners of language 1 (see (4)). Thus, by this direct effect, the
incentives to use language 1 as a medium of production increase with α1.3
However, there is also the “indirect effect” that works through the learning
decision of language-2 speakers. They are less enthusiastic about learning
language 1 if language 1 is more accessible. This can be seen from the proportion
of readers with mother tongue 2 who learn language 1
c1
C1
¼ p1 þ n1ð Þ 1 α1ð Þ
C1
where we have dc1ðα1Þdα1 ¼  p1 þ n1ð Þ<0. Only those readers with mother tongue 2
that have very small learning cost c will endeavor to learn language 1 if α1 is
large. This language-learning effect reduces the producers’ incentives to employ
language 1 (see (5)). Thus, we have two opposing effects of accessibility on
language adoption.
2.4 Literary production with several producers
(option demand)
Let us now turn to two or more producers. We focus on a producer A whose
overall production nA is divided between language 1 (nA1 ) and language 2
3 Assume, alternatively, that language learning is very costly and that there is no language
learning at all. Then, the producer is the only decision maker. The readership is the one from
above with c1 ¼ c2 ¼ 0; i.e., it is given by
R n1ð Þ ¼ n1 q1 þ q2α1ð Þ þ n n1ð Þ q2 þ q1α2ð Þ
¼ n1 q1 þ q2α1  q2 þ q1α2½ ð Þ þ n q2 þ q1α2ð Þ
Thus, language 1 is chosen if q1 þ q2α1  q2 þ q1α2½ ð Þ is positive or, equivalently, if q1q2 > 1α11α2
holds. Therefore, the effect found in the text above is also obtained if there is no language
learning.
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(nA2 ¼ nA  nA1 ). The other producers also employ language 1 (nothers1 ) and lan-
guage 2 (nothers2 ). A’s readership can then be defined as
RA nA1
 	 ¼ nA1 q1 þ q2 c1C1 þ α1 1 c1C1
   






   
It depends on the production decision by author A, on the populations using
languages 1 and 2 as mother tongues (q1 and q2, respectively), and on the
learning decisions taken by these populations.
As shown in the Appendix (proof of proposition 2.2), a producer tends to
find production in that language attractive that is used by most other producers.
Therefore, we are justified in looking for symmetric equilibria, only. In these
equilibria, all producers choose the same language for literary production.
Interestingly, there may exist two equilibria:
Proposition 2.2. In the synchronic model with m symmetric producers, language 1
rather than 2 becomes the exclusive literary language for production (compare [D])
under the broad-conditions stated in proposition 2.1 above. Furthermore, we find:
a) If q1q2 is small (large), language 2 (language 1) becomes the exclusive literary
language for production.
b) In a medium range of q1q2, there exist two symmetric equilibria. In one of them, all
producers choose language 1, in the other, all producers choose language 2. The
larger the number of producers, the larger the range with two possible equilibria.
c) For two or more producers, the readership maximizing language may not be
adopted in equilibrium.
Thus, the important variable is q1q2, the ratio of the population sizes (see Figure 2).












Two symmetric equilibria. 
In one, all producers 







Figure 2: One or two equilibria for at least two producers.
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According to (b), there exist parameter constellations such that all producers can
coordinate on language 1 or all producers can coordinate on language 2. The
larger the number of producers m, the more extended is the range of q1q2 for which
either language might be adopted in equilibrium. Although the model is static, a
snowball-effect like mechanism might occur: One producer adopts a language
and therefore, that language is more attractive to language learners, so that
other producers also tend to adopt it. (c) claims that an equilibrium may not be
optimal (in the sense of readership maximization).
2.5 Non-option demand
The model in this section differs from the preceding ones in two respects. First,
up to now, readership was defined by some product q  n where q refers to the
quantity of potential readers and n to the quantity of literary products. Against
this option-demand setup, one might argue that readers have a limited capacity
of actual reading. Let us, therefore, understand q as the capacity for reading in
the overall population. For example, each reader spends some specific time
interval on reading (for example, 10 days a year). Second, in order to keep the
model tractable, we disregard learning and assume that readers of language
community 1 use language 1 only.
Assume two producers A and B and two languages 1 and 2 with capacities
for reading q1 and q2, respectively. Literary production of producers A and B
employ languages 1 and 2. By nA1 we denote A’s literary production that uses
language 1, and so on. We also define
nA :¼ nA1 þ nA2
nB :¼ nB1 þ nB2
and take nA and nB as exogenous.
Readerships for producers A and B are defined as
RA nA1 ; n
B
1
 	 ¼ q1 nA1nA1 þ nB1 þ q2
nA2
nA2 þ nB2
RB nA1 ; n
B
1
 	 ¼ q1 nB1nA1 þ nB1 þ q2
nB2
nA2 þ nB2
and we find RA þ RB ¼ q1 þ q2. Again, we assume that producers A and B know
how to write in both languages 1 and 2.
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We obtain
Proposition 2.3. In the synchronic reading-capacity (non-option demand) model,
the unique Nash equilibrium is given by
nA1
 	 ¼ nA q1
q1 þ q2
nB1
 	 ¼ nB q1
q1 þ q2
Proof: see Appendix.
This proposition shows that languages supported by small communities may
subsist (see (N) in the introduction). For example, in many languages (except for
the very small ones), journals or magazines are produced. The most notable
feature of the equilibrium is proportionality:
– Theproductionusing languages 1 and 2 is proportional to the reading capacities:
nA1
 	 þ nB1 	
nA2
 	 þ nB2 	 ¼
q1
q2





 	 ¼ nB1
 	
nB2
 	 ¼ q1q2
If we compare the option demand models in the previous section to the non-
option demand one in this section, we immediately realize an important differ-
ence. If producers want to be read (this section) and not just to be potentially
read (the previous sections), they will also produce for smaller language com-
munities. This explains why, after 5,000 years of literacy, not all literary pro-
duction is in one language.
3 Diachronic models
3.1 Setup
Turning back to option demand and one producer, we now consider one
language and its changes over time (Ct). We begin with two periods t ¼ p; n
(see Figure 3). We assume that the vernacular changes over time and call
language 0 the vernacular in period p and language 1 the vernacular in period
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n. The speakers perfectly know their vernaculars. Speakers in period n (who
have language 1 as their mother tongue) can learn language 0 at cost c. The
literary productions in the periods p and n are denoted by p and n, respectively.
Literary production in period p takes place in the vernacular employed in p,
language 0. The quantity of that production is denoted by p or p0. Literary
production in period n can employ language 0 (the language of the past) or
language 1, the vernacular of period n. Denoting production in period n by n0
and n1, respectively, we then have the literary production
n ¼ n0 þ n1
in period n.
After the two-period model (Section 3.2) we turn to a three-period one
(Section 3.3). The periods are denoted as p (“past”), n (“now”) and f which
stands for “future”. We also use f for the literary production in period f (see
Figure 4). Finally, we deal with the forking model in Section 3.4.
3.2 Old-language learning with two periods
We begin with two periods and assume that the language learners take the
production in their period into account and adjust their learning decisions
accordingly. For the readers of period n, assume this payoff function
period p
language 0 with production p0 = p
period n
language 0 with production n0
language 1 with production n1
Figure 3: The diachronic model with two periods.
period p (vernac. 0)
lang.0 with prod. p0 = p
period n (vernac.1)
lang.1 with prod. n1
lang.0 with prod. n0
period f (vernac.2)
lang.0 with prod. f0
lang.1 with prod. f1
lang.2 with prod. f2
Figure 4: The diachronic model with three periods.
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un ¼ p0 þ n1 þ n0  c;
α p0 þ n1 þ α n0;
reader learns language 0
reader does not learn language 0
(
where α is the accessibility of (the past) language 0. In period n, learning
language 0 is profitable if
c< 1 αð Þ p0 þ n0ð Þ ¼: cn0




where Cn0 > p0 þ n. Then, a proportion of
cn0
Cn0
¼ 1 αð Þ p0 þ n0ð Þ
Cn0
< 1
speakers alive in period 1 learns language 0.
We now turn to literary production done by one producer, only. We define
readership by








   











< 1, readership maximization implies language production with
exclusive use of the vernacular in period n: n0 ¼ 0 and n1 ¼ n. We find:
Proposition 3.1. In the diachronic model with two time periods p (past) and n
(present), the producer in period n does not use language 0 for literary production.
Proof: obvious.
The upshot of this two-period model is this: some readers have an interest in
learning language 0, but the producer does not. The reason behind this result is
simple enough. The producer in period n has no reason to produce for those
having lived in the past (they cannot read). With respect to those living in the
present, he maximizes readership when he uses their vernacular, language 1.
After all, only a part of those living now choose to learn language 0. While this
result is straightforward, it shows the difficulty of explaining the production in
language 0, the vernacular of the past.
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3.3 A three-period model of old-language learning
3.3.1 Setup
In order to show how an old language (like Latin) can become a standard
language for production, we need to assume three periods (see Figure 4). The
assumptions are close to those of the two-period model. For simplification, we
assume that readers learn no or one additional language, only. We need some
assumptions on the maximal costs of language learning. It seems plausible to
assume Cn0 <C
f
0, i.e., that the cost of learning language 0 is smaller for readers in
period n than for those in period f . Similarly, one might assume Cf1 < C
f
0, i.e.,
that readers in period f find language 1 (the vernacular of period n) easier to
learn than language 0 (the vernacular of period p). However, in order to simplify
our formulae, we let C :¼ Cn0 ¼ Cf0 ¼ Cf1 . Again, we assume that not all agents
find language learning profitable. Formally, the costs of language learning C are
suffciently large (larger than pþ nþ f is sufficient).
Literary production is described by
p ¼ p0
n ¼ n0 þ n1 and
f ¼ f0 þ f1 þ f2
and readers in periods n and f have the payoff functions
un ¼ p0 þ n1 þ n0  c; reader learns language 0




p0 þ n0 þ αn1 þ f2 þ f0 þ αf1  c;
αp0 þ αn0 þ n1 þ f2 þ αf0 þ f1  c;
α2p0 þ α2n0 þ αn1 þ f2 þ α2f0 þ αf1
8><
>:
reader learns language 0
reader learns language 1
reader does not learn any language
respectively. Consider, for example, the second line of uf where we find
αp0 þ αn0 þ n1 þ f2 þ αf0 þ f1  c ¼ α p0 þ n0 þ f0ð Þ þ n1 þ f2 þ f1  c:
The reader in period f can perfectly understand his own vernacular (f2) and also
literary production that uses language 1 (n1 þ f1). Language 1 is only one step
away from language 0. Therefore, readers from period f who know language 1
have a better understanding (indicated by factor α) of language-0 production
than those who have not learned language 1 (see factor α2 in the third line).
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3.3.2 Current readership
Consider the literary producers of the middle period n. We develop two sub-
models. In the first (this section), producers want to maximize their current
readership, only. In the following section, they try to maximize their long-term
readership. See the introduction for a short discussion. We will see below that
long-term readership maximization can, and current-readership maximization
cannot, explain the use of language 0 by the producers of the middle period n.
Current readership is defined by




people alive in period nð Þ
where rn0 is the percentage of readers in period n that have learned language 0.
We obtain
Proposition 3.2. In the diachronic model with three time periods p (past), n (present),
and f (future), if producers aim to maximize current readership, only, the producers in
periods n and f use only their respective vernaculars for literary production.
Proof: see Appendix.
An extension of this model to any number of periods yields the same result:
current readership maximization implies that producers solely use their verna-
culars for literary production. The reason is always the same. Past readers are
dead, producers do not care for future readers (by definition), and therefore,
they maximize readership within period n by using the language that people in
this period know best (the current vernacular).
3.3.3 Long-term readership
We now turn to maximization of long-term readership. The readership of the
middle-period producers is now enlarged and is composed of period-n and
period-f readers:




people alive in period nð Þ
þ qf n1 rn1 þ α rf0 þ rfno
h i 
þ n0 rf0 þ αrf1 þ α2rfno
 h i





1 denote the percentage of readers in periods n or f that have
learned languages 0 or 1, respectively. rfnois the percentage of period-f readers
that have not learned any second language.
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Proposition 3.3. In the diachronic model with three time periods p (past), n
(present), and f (future), if producers aim to maximize long-term readership, the
producer in period f uses his vernacular, only. Assume qn ¼ qf . We find:
– The producer in period n employs language 0 if C is sufficiently small, and
language 1, otherwise.
– The chances for language 0 being used are smaller with increasing literary
production (p0 < n) than with decreasing literary production (p0 > n).
Proof: see Appendix.
The producer in period f is in a situation comparable to that of a producer in
period n in the two-period model. He maximizes his readership (there is no
difference between the current and the long-term one) by using the language
known perfectly by everybody alive.
The producer in period n has the choice between the vernacular language 1 and
language 0, the past language. He may consider using the past language if the cost
of language learning is relatively small. Then, a substantial portion of people alive in
periods n and f will consider learning language 0. Of course, he can reach the people
in period n better with language 1. Thus, it is for the sake of period-f readers that he
considers using language 0. Here, we have our first explanation of how a past
language can develop into a standard for literary production. Turning to the second
bullet, the willingness to learn language 0 depends on the production in that
language. It might be produced in period n (the proposition is about the conditions
for this to happen) and it might have been produced in period p. If that production is
large in comparison to the production in period n (p0 > n), language 0 stands a
higher chance of becoming the standard language for production.
3.4 A forking two-period model (old French and old Spanish)
We now turn to the forking model (see [Cf] in the introduction). There exists one
language 0 in period p that develops into two different languages 1 and 2 that
are vernaculars in period n (see Figure 5). We focus on language learning and
production in period n. Overall production in period n is fixed and given by
n ¼ n0 þ n1 þ n2
Speakers in period n (who have language 1 or language 2 as their mother tongue)
can learn language 0 or the other vernacular. We denote the accessibility of
language 1 from language 2 by α (and also the other way around) and the
accessibility of language 0 from any of the daughter languages by α0. The reader
in period n whose mother tongue is 1 has the payoff function
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u1 ¼
p0 þ n0 þ n1 þ αn2  c;
α0 p0 þ n0ð Þ þ n1 þ n2  c;
α0 p0 þ n0ð Þ þ n1 þ αn2;
8><
>:
reader learns language 0
reader learns language 2
reader does not learn any language
We define readership by
R ¼ q1 n0 r10 þ α0 1 r10
 	 	þ n1 þ αn2
 
þ q2 n0 r20 þ α0 1 r20




0) is the percentage of readers with mother tongue 1 (with mother
tongue 2) that have learned language 0.
We now present two propositions. Both assume (without loss of generality)
q2 > q1. Then, if one of the two period-n languages is chosen, language 2 is the
dominant one. The propositions differ with respect to the accessibility assump-
tion. The first is based on α< α0. Thus, the reader with mother tongue 1 (Old
French) who does not learn any language finds the literature of language 0 (Latin)
more easily accessible than the literature of language 2 (Old Spanish). Here, we
assume that language learning is very difficult. Taking this assumption to the
extreme, language learning is excluded. The second proposition is based on the
inverse inequality α > α0. Both propositions identify conditions under which Latin
(or another old language) may become the standard for literary production.
Proposition 3.4. In the diachronic forking model with two time periods p (past)
and n (present) and no language learning, assume α< α0 (Old French closer to
Latin than to Old Spanish) and q2 > q1.
– The producer in period n employs language 0 if
– α0 is relatively large,
– α is small in comparison with α0 (Old French much closer to Latin than to
Old Spanish), and
– the population sizes do not differ too much.
– Otherwise, he employs language 2.
period p (vernac.0) 
lang.0 with prod. p0 = p  
period n (vernaculars 1 and 2)
language 0 with production n0 
language 1 with production n1  and population q1 
language 2 with production n2  and population q2 
Figure 5: The forking model with two periods.
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Proof: see Appendix.
According to the proposition, Latin may dominate Old French and Old
Spanish if the cost of language learning is very large so that (practically)
no language learning occurs. Also, α0 has to be large, much larger than α.
Thus, a producer is enticed to use Latin for his literary production because
this literature can also be enjoyed by speakers of Old French and Old
Spanish. Finally, the population sizes must not differ too much. Otherwise,
the larger population of one language would lead to the domination of this
language.
Proposition 3.5. In the diachronic forking model with two time periods p (past)
and n (present), assume α> α0 (Old French closer to Old Spanish than to Latin)
and q2 > q1.
– The producer in period n employs language 0 if
– C is sufficiently small
– α is relatively large and α0 is relatively small (Old French much closer to
Old Spanish than to Latin), and
– production is decreasing (p0 > nÞ or only mildly increasing
1α
1α0 n < p0 < n
 
:
– Otherwise, he employs language 2.
Proof: see Appendix.
Here, Latin may become the standard language if the cost of language
learning is low or, for medium cost of language learning, if literary produc-
tion in period p is larger than (or only minimally smaller than) literary
production in period n. The reason behind this result is the following: the
speakers of Old French can enjoy Old Spanish due to the similarity between
these two languages (α is relatively large). Therefore, if p0 is large in com-
parison to n, they find learning Latin attractive. This attractiveness of learn-
ing Latin carries over to the literary producer in period n who also finds Latin
an attractive medium.
4 Conclusion
In order to understand the interconnections between language learning and
literary production, we employ standard methods from microeconomics, in
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particular from Game Theory and Industrial Organization. Among our findings,
we want to highlight the following ones:
1. Translations (modeled by accessibility) have contradicting effects on helping
a language gain readers and/or literary producers (see Section 2.2).
– For given literary productions, language learning is made unattractive if
good translations from foreign languages exist.4
– For given learning decisions, the readership of a language increases if
good translations into foreign languages are available. Then, that lan-
guage becomes more attractive from the producers’ point of view.
2. There can be a theoretical ambiguity as to which of several languages
is chosen by producers and hence preferred by language learners (see
Section 2.4). This ambiguity is typical for network effects and the resulting
path dependence is well-known from the literature on competing technolo-
gies (see Arthur (1989) and below).
3. Option demand models tend to reduce the number of surviving languages
drastically, while non-option demand (see Section 2.5) explains the persis-
tence of small languages (possibly above a certain threshold, see Grin (1992)
and sections 2 and 3 in Fishman (1989)).
4. We offer three explanations of how a past language like Latin or Sanskrit
can develop into a standard for literary production.
– First, a producer may use the old language in order to reach out to
future readers (see Section 3.3.3).
– Second, in a forking situation, a language like Latin may dominate its
daughter languages Old French and Old Spanish for a while
(see Section 3.4). This result might be obtained for large learning cost
and pronounced dissimilarities between daughter languages (see
proposition 3.4).
– Third, Latin may also dominate in a forking situation where we have
small learning cost together with similar daughter languages (see
proposition 3.5).
In a survey article, Grin (1996: 28–30) rightly warns against the facile use of
analogy in the overlapping fields of linguistics and economics. The current
author likes to side with Church and King (1993) and Dalmazzone (1999) who
point out the similarities between language and technology adoption. In fact, we
encounter so-called network effects in both fields. For product markets, network
effects are said to be present when demand depends positively on past and
4 Colomer (1996) deals with the related question of how to compare the social benefits and
costs of language learning versus translations.
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expected sales. Examples of network-effect goods are communication systems,
television standards, and video systems. Network effects provide large-scale
producers with advantages over small-scale producers. A comprehensive survey
is Farrell and Klemperer (2007). Similarly, languages spoken by many speakers
(see the effects of q1 and q2 in our models) are attractive for language learners
and literary producers, still increasing the number of speakers. English is the
obvious case in point.
Technologies and languages can be more or less “compatible” with each
other. Thus, in order to enable communication, telephones have to adhere to
specific technical specifications which they may fulfill, completely or partly.
Languages can also be more or less similar to each other (see our remarks on
contrastive linguistics in the introduction). In our model, we have a parameter
for compatibility that we call accessibility.
Another similarity between technologies and languages is “sponsorship”. A
technology may be “sponsored”, i.e., a firm possessing (or using) a technology
may be interested in ensuring that the technology becomes standard (Katz and
Shapiro 1986). Similarly, languages may be sponsored by national or suprana-
tional governments. In contrast to technologies, governments may sponsor
several and even minority languages (see the Swiss or the Irish examples in
Coulmas (1991)). We are then entering the extensive literature on language
planning and language policy. See Wardhaugh (2006: Ch. 15) for a survey,
Ricento (2006) for a collection of articles on language policy, or Pool (1996)
for an optimal set of official languages in the EU. Our article also contributes to
that literature, if only by exploring the effect of translations on the competitive
success of languages (see finding 1, above).
One may argue that firms cannot invent languages in the manner that firms
invent new products. Indeed, research and development undertaken by firms is
often considered as vital for their success while authors tend to choose a given
language rather than inventing one. However, languages such as Esperanto or
Klingon are “constructed” or “invented” (Okrent 2009) or, on a more modest
scale, natural languages are “controlled” (Kuhn 2014).
Our model might be extended in different ways. For example, one might
include the communicative benefit of knowing a language many other people
know (and thus link up to previous models based on that network effect). Also,
the fact of knowing two or more languages does not settle the question of which
language is used (most of the time or for specific purposes). A decision-theoretic
analysis in that direction is presented by Grin (1990).
Future research might also turn to specific language histories. There, one
might engage in finding out whether these histories bear out our results or, if
they do not, in identifying the specific cultural and political conditions that are
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responsible. In the Indian case, for example, a thorough treatment has been
given by Pollock (2006). For Latin and its successor languages, the reader might
profitably turn to Auerbach (1965), Hammond (1976), Irvine (1994), or Herman
(2000).
Acknowledgments: The author is thankful for many helpful hints, by anon-
ymous referees and also by Florian Coulmas, Martin Kohl, Hendrik Kohrs and
Katharina Lotzen.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 2.1
The second derivative of readership R with respect to n1 is positive so that we
have extremal solutions. By nþ p2  C2, we obtain




1 p1þnð Þ 1α1ð Þ2C1 þ α1
 
1 p2þnð Þ 1α2ð Þ2C2 þ α2
  ¼: Q1
Thus, if q1q2 >Q
1 holds, the representative producer employs language 1, only. If
q1
q2
<Q1 holds, the representative producer employs language 2, only.
Proof of proposition 2.2
Assume m literary producers, among them a producer called A. Focus on
producer A who is faced with the literary productions of the other
authors nothers1 (language 1), n
others
2 (language 2), and n
others ¼ nothers1 þ nothers2 < n:
Indicating the production of producer A with A, we define
nA :¼ n nothers
nA1 :¼ n1  nothers1
nA2 :¼ n2  nothers2
and obtain nA2 ¼ nA  nA1 : The second partial derivative of RA nA1 ; nothers1 ; nothers2
 	
(as given in the main text) with respect to nA1 is positive. We find
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RA nA1 ¼ nA; nothers1 ; nothers2
 	













2 þnAð Þ 1α2ð Þ2
C2
þ α2
  ¼: Qcrit
where the last inequality uses the assumption made in the main text that C2 is
sufficiently large. Assume that the others (predominantly) choose language 1 so
that nothers1 is large and n
others
2 small. Then, Q
crit is small and producer A also uses
language 1. Therefore, we are justified in looking for symmetric equilibria only.
A separating equilibrium might exist, but it would be unstable. Thus, all pro-





















mð Þ 1α2ð Þ2
C2
þ α2
  ¼: Qm2
with Q12 :¼ limm!1Q
m
2 ¼

































1 p2þnð Þ 1α2ð Þ2C2 þ α2
  ¼: Qm1
with Q11 :¼ limm!1Q
m
1 ¼
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Now, from










1 for m  2





language 2 should be adopted according to proposition 2.1, but language 1 is
adopted on one of the two equilibria according to case (b) of the current
proposition.
Proof of proposition 2.3










nA  nA1 þ nB2
 	2
with negative second derivative. Thus,
q1
nB1
nA1 þ nB1ð Þ2
¼ q2 n
B  nB1
nA  nA1 þ nB  nB1ð Þ2
ðC:1Þ








nB  nB1 þ nA2
 	2 ðC:2Þ
is the corresponding condition for B. The Nash equilibrium is the tuple of




that fulfills both equalities.
Proof of proposition 3.2
We now solve the three-period model by backward induction. Since no decisions
are made in period p, we have two stages. We begin with language learning in
period f .
– Learning language 1 is better than learning no language if
– c  1 αð Þ f1 þ n1ð Þ þ α α2ð Þ f0 þ n0 þ p0ð Þ ¼: cf1
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– Learning language 0 is better than learning no language if
– c  1 α2ð Þ f0 þ n0 þ p0ð Þ ¼: cf0
– Learning language 0 is better than learning language 1 if
– f0 þ n0 þ p0 > f1 þ n1
According to the last inequality, we distinguish two cases.
– Large language-0 base: f0 þ n0 þ p0 > f1 þ n1
– In period f , language 0 is learned by the readership proportion




1α2ð Þ f0þn0þp0ð Þ
C
– In period f , no language is learned by the readership proportion




– Small language-0 base: f0 þ n0 þ p0 < f1 þ n1
– In period f , language 1 is learned by the readership proportion




1αð Þ f1þn1ð Þþ αα2ð Þ f0þn0þp0ð Þ
C
– In period f , no language is learned by the readership proportion




Disregarding qn (which does not make any substantial difference), the reader-
ship of period-f literary products is given by
f2 þ f0 r f ;la 00 þ α2r f ;la 0no
 
þ f1α;
f2 þ f0 αr f ;sm01 þ α2r f ;sm0no
 
þ f1 r f ;sm 01 þ αr f ;sm0no
 
;
large language 0 base
small language 0 base
8><
>:





– Large language-0 base: n0 þ p0 > n1 or n0 > np02
– In period f , language 0 is learned by the readership proportion




1α2ð Þ p0þn0ð Þ
C
– In period f , no language is learned by the readership proportion




– Small language-0 base: n0 þ p0 < n1 or n0 < np02
– In period f , language 1 is learned by the readership proportion




1αð Þn1þ αα2ð Þ p0þn0ð Þ
C
– In period f , no language is learned by the readership proportion
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The readership of period-2 literary products is f .
We now turn to period n. Period- n learners are in the very same position as
in the two-period model. Thus, a proportion of
rn0 :¼
1 αð Þ p0 þ n0ð Þ
C
speakers alive in period n learn language 0 while the proportion rnnot 0 :¼ 1 rn0
does not learn language 0.
Since the producers of period n maximize current readership, only, they are
in the same position as in the two-period model, i.e., we obtain
n0 ¼ 0 and n1 ¼ n:
Proof of proposition 3.3
The proposition builds on the results obtained for current readership (see the
previous appendix). In particular, we need to distinguish between large and
small language-0 bases as defined above. We can safely disregard qn ¼ qf . For
large language-0 base (n0 þ p0 > n1 or n0 > np02 ), we obtain the period-n produ-
cer’s readership
Rn;la 0 n0ð Þ ¼ n1 þ n0 rn0 þ αrnnot 0
 	
people alive in period nð Þ
þ αn1 þ n0 rf ;la 00 þ α2rf ;la 0no
 
people alive in period fð Þ
¼ n 1þ αð Þ þ n0 1þ α2 þ 1 αð Þ
2 p0 þ n0ð Þ
C
þ 1 α
2ð Þ2 p0 þ n0ð Þ
C
 !
The second derivative with respect to n0 is positive.
Similarly, for a small language-0 base (n0 þ p0 < n1 or n0 < np02 ), we obtain
the period-n producer’s readership
Rn;sm 0 n0ð Þ ¼ n1 þ n0 rn0 þ αrnno 0
 	
people alive in period nð Þ
þ n1 rf ;sm 01 þ αrf ;sm 0no
 
þ n0 αrf ;sm 01 þ α2rf ;sm 0no
 
people alive in period fð Þ
¼ n n0ð Þ 1þ αð Þ þ n0 αþ α2
 	þ n0 1 αð Þ2 p0 þ n0ð ÞC
þ n n0ð Þ 1 αð Þ þ n0 α α2
 	
  1 αð Þ n n0ð Þ þ α α2ð Þ p0 þ n0ð Þ
C
again with positive second derivative,
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Besides the 0-base (which can be large or small), we need the distinction
between
– increasing literary production which is given by p0 < n and
– decreasing literary production which is given by p0 > n.
We then obtain the following matrix:
p0 < n p0 > n
n0 >
np0
2 Case “incr:prod:þ large 0 base” Case“decr:prod:þ large 0 base“
n0 <
np0
2 Case “incr:prod:þ small 0 base” excluded see belowð Þ
Assume, first, p0 < n: We find:
– for the case “incr. prod. þ large 0-base”




2þ 2α 2αþ α
2 þ 2 	 3nþ p0ð Þ ¼: Cla 0;p0 < n;n np02





>Rn;sm 0 0ð Þ,
C<
1 α
2þ 2α n 2αþ α
2  2 	þ α2p0 	 ¼: Csm 0;p0 < n;np02 0
np0













>Rn;sm 0 0ð Þ)Rn;la 0 nð Þ>Rn;sm 0 n p0
2
 
Thus, the important comparison concerns n0 ¼ n versus n0 ¼ 0: We obtain
Rn;la0 nð Þ >Rn;sm0 0ð Þ,
C<
1 α
1þ α n αþ 1ð Þ
2 þ p0 αþ α2 þ 2
 	  ¼: Cp0 < n
We now turn to decreasing literary production (p0 > n) which excludes n0 <
np0
2 .
Thus, we have the case “decr. prod. þ large 0-base”. Here, we find
Rn;la0 nð Þ>Rn;la0 0ð Þ,
C <
2αþ α2 þ 2ð Þ 1 αð Þ
1þ αð Þ nþ p0ð Þ ¼: C
p0 > n
The preceding calculations imply the proposition
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– Language 0 is employed if C is sufficiently small. In particular:
– For p0 > n (decreasing literary production), the producer employs lan-
guage 0, only, in case of
C <
2αþ α2 þ 2ð Þ 1 αð Þ
1þ αð Þ nþ p0ð Þ ¼: C
p0 > n
and language 1, otherwise.
– For p0 < n (increasing literary production), the producer employs lan-
guage 0, only, in case of
C<
1 α
1þ α n αþ 1ð Þ
2 þ p0 αþ α2 þ 2
 	  ¼: Cp0 < n
and language 1, otherwise.
– Cp0 > n >Cp0 < n is easily confirmed. Thus, the chances for language 0 are
smaller with increasing literary production than with decreasing literary
production.
Proof of proposition 3.4
Assume α< α0, q1 < q2 (without loss of generality), and C > p0 þ n. We solve a
one-stage model (no language learning). Readership is then defined by
R ¼ q1 n0α0 þ n1 þ αn2½  þ q2 n0α0 þ αn1 þ n2½ 
¼ n1 q1 1 α0ð Þ  q2 α0  αð Þ½ 
þ n2 q2 1 α0ð Þ  q1 α0  αð Þ½  þ nα0 q1 þ q2ð Þ:
By the above assumptions, we have three cases only:
– 0< q1 1 α0ð Þ  q2 α0  αð Þ< q2 1 α0ð Þ  q1 α0  αð Þ or, equivalently,
q1
q2
< α0α1α0 . Readership is maximized for n0 ¼ 0; n1 ¼ 0; n2 ¼ n:





> α0α1α0 . Readership is maximized for n0 ¼ 0; n1 ¼ 0; n2 ¼ n:






Readership is maximized for n0 ¼ n; n1 ¼ 0; n2 ¼ 0:
Together with q1 < q2, the last inequality implies 1α0α0α q2 < q1 < q2 and
α0 > 1þα2 .
Language competition 323
Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek Leipzig
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 28.05.18 10:00
Proof of proposition 3.5
Assume α> α0, q1 < q2 (without loss of generality), and C > p0 þ n: We solve the
two-stage model by backward induction. We begin with language learning in
period n. For a reader whose mother tongue is language 1, learning language 0
is better than learning language 2 if
1 α0ð Þ n0 þ p0ð Þ> 1 αð Þn2 or
n0 þ p0 > 1 α1 α0 n2
We denote this case by “la 1” and the opposite case by “sm 1”. We now turn to
the question of whether learning a language is better than learning no language.
For readers with mother tongue 1, we have:
– In case of “la 1”, learning language 0 is better than learning no language if
– c  1 α0ð Þ n0 þ p0ð Þ ¼: c10
holds (readership proportion r1;la 10 :¼ c
1
0
C ¼ 1α0ð Þ n0þp0ð ÞC )
– In case of “sm 1”, learning language 2 is better than learning no language if
– c  1 αð Þn2 ¼: c12
holds (readership proportion r1;sm 10 :¼ c
1
2
C ¼ 1αð Þn2C ).
Interchanging the indices for 1 and 2 yields corresponding results for readers
with mother tongue 2. In particular, we obtain r2;la 20 and r
2;sm 2
1 . In the “la 1”-
“la 2” case (n0 þ p0 > 1α1α0 n2 and n0 þ p0 > 1α1α0 n1), we obtain the readership
Rla 1;la 2 n0; n1; n2ð Þ
¼ q1 n0 r1;la 10 þ α0 1 r1;la 10
  
þ n1 þ αn2
h i
þ q2 n0 r2;la 20 þ α0 1 r2;la 20
  
þ αn1 þ n2
h i
¼ q1 n n1  n2ð Þ α0þ 1 α0ð Þ





The “la 1”-“sm 2” readership (case n0 þ p0 > 1α1α0 n2 and n0 þ p0 < 1α1α0 n1) is
Rla 1;sm 2 n0; n1; n2ð Þ
¼ q1 n0 r1;la 10 þ α0 1 r1;la 10
  
þ n1 þ αn2
h i
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¼ q1 n n1  n2ð Þ α0 þ 1 α0ð Þ
2 n n1  n2ð Þ þ p0ð Þ
C
 !
þ n1 þ αn2
" #






and the “sm 1”-“la 2” readership is (reversing the roles)
Rsm 1;la 2 n0; n1; n2ð Þ




þ q2 n n1  n2ð Þ α0 þ 1 α0ð Þ
2 n n1  n2ð Þ þ p0ð Þ
C
 !
þ αn1 þ n2
" #
:
The readership in the “sm 1”-“sm 2” case is
Rsm 1;sm 2 n0; n1; n2ð Þ
¼ q1 α0n0 þ n1 þ n2 r1;sm 12 þ α 1 r1;sm 12
 	 	
 














In all these four cases, the Hessian with respect to n1 and n2 is positive definite.
Thus, the readership functions are strictly convex and at least one of the three
variables n0; n1, or n2 is zero. Letting one of these variables be zero, the
restricted readership functions are convex, too. Therefore, it is sufficient to
focus on the three extreme cases:
– n0 ¼ n; n1 ¼ 0; n2 ¼ 0
Here, we have nþ p0 > 1α1α0  0 (where the 0 may stand for n2 or n1), i.e., the
“la” cases, and we find the readership
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Rla 1;la 2 n0 ¼ nð Þ
¼ q1n α0 þ 1 α0ð Þ
2 nþ p0ð Þ
C
 !
þ q2n α0 þ 1 α0ð Þ
2 nþ p0ð Þ
C
 !
– n0 ¼ 0; n1 ¼ n; n2 ¼ 0
For speakers of language 1, we have the “la” case (nþ p0 > 1α1α0  0), while
speakers of language 2 may obey p0 > 1α1α0 n or not. If p0 >
1α
1α0 n holds, we
have readership
Rla 1;la 2 n1 ¼ nð Þ ¼ n q1 þ αq2ð Þ
If, however, p0 < 1α1α0 n, we have the “la 1”-“sm 2” readership




– n0 ¼ 0; n1 ¼ 0; n2 ¼ n
If p0 > 1α1α0 n, we have the readership
Rla 1;la 2 n2 ¼ nð Þ ¼ n q2 þ αq1ð Þ
If, however, p0 < 1α1α0 n, we obtain the readership





So far, we have not made use of α > α0 and q1 < q2. From now on, we call
p0 > 1α1α0 n “p0 la” and p0 <
1α
1α0 n “p0 sm”. Starting with the latter, we find
Rla 1;la 2 n0 ¼ nð Þ >Rsm 1;la 2 n2 ¼ nð Þ,
C <
1 α0ð Þ2 q1 þ q2ð Þ nþ p0ð Þ  q1 1 αð Þ2n
q1 α α0ð Þ þ q2 1 α0ð Þ ¼: C
p0 sm;02
and, analogously,
Rla 1;la 2 n0 ¼ nð Þ>Rla 1;sm 2 n1 ¼ nð Þ,
C<
1 α0ð Þ2 q1 þ q2ð Þ nþ p0ð Þ  q2 1 αð Þ2n
q2 α α0ð Þ þ q1 1 α0ð Þ ¼: C
p0 sm;0 1
By q2 > q1 and α> α0, we have
Cp0 sm;0  2 <Cp0 sm;0  1
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q2 > q1 implies
Rsm 1;la 2 n2 ¼ nð Þ>Rla 1;sm 2 n1 ¼ nð Þ
Thus, for “p0 sm” (p0 < 1α1α0 n), we obtain:
– for C<Cp0 sm;02, all production takes place in language 0,
– for C >Cp0 sm;02, all production takes place in language 2.
We now turn to case “p0 la” and observe
R n0 ¼ nð Þ>Rp0 la n1 ¼ nð Þ ¼ n q1 þ αq2ð Þ,
C <
n 1 α0ð Þ2 q1 þ q2ð Þ nþ p0ð Þ
q1n 1 α0ð Þ þ q2n α α0ð Þ ¼: C
p0 la;01
and analogously
R n0 ¼ nð Þ>Rp0 la n2 ¼ nð Þ,
C <
n 1 α0ð Þ2 q1 þ q2ð Þ nþ p0ð Þ
q2n 1 α0ð Þ þ q1n α α0ð Þ ¼: C
p0 la;02
We have
Cp0 la;02 <Cp0 la;01
and
Rp0 la n1 ¼ nð Þ<Rp0 la n2 ¼ nð Þ
Thus, for “p0 la” (p0 > 1α1α0 n),
– for C<Cp0 la;02, all production takes place in language 0,
– for C >Cp0 la;02, all production takes place in language 2.
By α > α0, we find
Cp0 sm;02 <Cp0 la;02
And hence, the producer in period n decides in the following manner:
– For C<Cp0 sm;02 (very small cost of language learning), he employs lan-
guage 0.
– For C >Cp0 la;02 (very large cost of language learning), he employs language 2.
– For Cp0 sm;02 <C<Cp0 la;02 (medium cost of language learning),
– he employs language 0 if p0 > 1α1α0 n (not strongly increasing literary
production) holds, but
– he employs language 2, otherwise.
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